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RACE BIAS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE
Hans Zeisel*
T WICE in the past fifteen years, federal courts of appeals
have been urged to reverse death sentences on the ground
that the death penalty was administered along racially discrim-
inatory lines. The first time, in Maxwell v. Bishop,1 a peti-
tioner submitted data to show discrimination against black
offenders. The second time, in Spinkellink v. Wainwright,2 a
petitioner submitted data to show bias against murderers of
white victims. The Spinkellink data indicated that such of-
fenders were substantially more likely to end up on death row
than were murderers of black victims.
Both times, the courts refused to find proof of racial dis-
crimination. Data that have since become available, provided
by the criminal justice system itself, make it clear that both
kinds of discrimination existed.
I. THE CHARGES OF BIAS
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,3 the Supreme Court in-
validated virtually all of the death penalty statutes then in
force, primarily on the ground that they failed to provide
sufficient safeguards against the arbitrary infliction of capital
punishment. 4 All five of the Justices who supported this result
expressed concern that the pre-1972 statutes were not being
administered evenhandedly. Justices Douglas and Marshall
explicitly suggested that the death penalty was being discrim-
inatorily imposed against racial minority defendants.5 Justice
* Emeritus Professor of Law and Sociology and Associate of the Center for Crim-
inal Justice Studies, University of Chicago. The author thanks Anthony G. Amster-
dam, John Charles Boger, and Joel Berger for their critical readings of this Comment.
1 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. i968), vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
2 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (i979). As noted by the
court of appeals, the correct spelling of the petitioner's name is "Spenkelink," 578
F.2d at 582 n.i, and I will use that spelling when referring to the man.
3 4o8 U.S. 238 (1972).
4 As the Court's wholesale reversal of death sentences in pending cases from other
states indicated, its intent in Furman was to invalidate all state capital statutes in
force in 2972. See, e.g., Pope v. Nebraska, 408 U.S. 933 (1972) (mem.) (vacating
Nebraska death sentence); Johnson v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 932 (1972) (mem.) (vacating
Louisiana death sentence); Stewart v. Massachusetts, 4o8 U.S. 845 (1972) (per curiam)
(vacating Massachusetts death sentence); Moore v. Illinois, 4o8 U.S. 786, 8oo (1972)
(vacating Illinois death sentence).
5 408 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., con-
curring).
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Stewart said that "racial discrimination has not been proved"
but that "if any basis can be discerned for the selection of
these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally
impermissible basis of race."' 6 Although the other two con-
curring Justices were silent on the subject of race, it is difficult
to conceive that any Justice concerned with arbitrariness would
knowingly tolerate a system of capital punishment in which
race affects the decision who will live or die. Under the equal
protection clause, which was written against the backdrop of
the Civil War, differential sentencing based on race is ob-
viously the ultimate affront to evenhandedness, the clearest
example of arbitrariness in a legal sense.
Four years after Furman, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia,7
Proffitt v. Florida,8 and Jurek v. Texas9 allowed newly enacted
state death penalty statutes to stand. The Gregg opinions said
that "[o]n their face these [new] procedures seem to satisfy the
concerns of Furman"10 and that, "[a]bsent facts to the con-
trary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated
in their charging decisions by factors other than the strength
of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the
death penalty if it convicts." 1 The Justices declined to strike
down the new laws, to quote Justice White's concurrence in
the judgment, "on what is simply an assertion of lack of faith
in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a funda-
mentally fair manner." 12 The data in the present study sug-
gest that the Court's faith in the fairness of the system may be
misplaced.
We begin with an observation about Maxwell v. Bishop
and then go on to review the data presented in Spinkellink to
show racial discrimination. Maxwell involved a claim that the
death penalty was being inflicted with disproportionate fre-
quency upon black offenders convicted of the rape of white
6 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's death penalty statute).
8 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute).
9 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas' death penalty statute).
1o 428 U.S. '53, 198 (i976),
Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
2Id. at 226. Pre-Furman statutes typically left the decision to impose the death
sentence to the unguided discretion of the jury, which made the decision at the end
of a single-stage trial on both guilt and penalty issues. The new statutes provide for
bifurcated or two-stage trials; the jury's attention is directed first to the question of
guilt or innocence and only afterwards to the appropriate sentence. During the
sentencing stage, the jury's discretion in determining whether to impose the death
sentence is limited by legislatively chosen factors deemed to aggravate or mitigate the
defendant's crime. Finally, each of the states has adopted some form of appellate
review of the propriety of each death sentence imposed.
1981]
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victims. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected
the claim as unproved. It found unpersuasive the petitioner's
evidence, which consisted of a study of the administration of
the death penalty for rape in Arkansas over a twenty-year
period. 13 Yet when the results of that study were later cited
by the petitioners in Gregg, the Solicitor General of the United
States, in his amicus curiae brief supporting capital punish-
ment, conceded that: "This is a careful and comprehensive
study, and we do not question its conclusion that during the
20 years in question, in southern states, there was discrimi-
nation in rape cases."' 14 The Solicitor General then added:
"The research does not provide support for a conclusion that
racial discrimination continues, however, or that it applies to
murder cases." 15
We see here the beginning of what has since become a
pattern - government officials admitting, after it no longer
matters legally, that discrimination has affected capital sen-
tencing and executions, but professing that such discrimination
is all a matter of the past and that the current data are too
scanty to support conclusions of continuing racial discrimina-
tion. The implication is that one has to wait for more exe-
cutions before evidence of discrimination will be considered.
This brings us to John Spenkelink. In the course of pre-
paring Spenkelink's case in Florida, Stephen D. Stittl6 and S.
Kay Isaly17 serendipitously discovered a statistical pattern that
had not been perceived before. In September 1977, when
Spenkelink's habeas corpus petition was argued before the
United States district court in Tallahassee, Florida, there were
114 men on the Florida death row. Ninety-four percent of
them had killed only white victims, two percent had killed
white and black victims, and four percent had killed only
blacks. 18
This surprising statistic invited further analysis. The ques-
tion was whether the racial discrepancy was caused by the
13 The study, conducted by Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang and coworkers, was subse-
quently published. Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death
Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119 (x973).
14 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae app. A at 5a, Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 74-6257).
's Id.
16 Professor of Law, Holland Law Center, University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida.
17 Paralegal at Sheppard & Carithers, Jacksonville, Florida. Sheppard & Carithers
has compiled a detailed record of the composition of the Florida death row. See infra
note i8. The death row data cited in this Comment are based on that record.
Is Unpublished Data collected by Sheppard & Carithers, Jacksonville, Florida
(,972-1981) (on file in Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Sheppard
& Carithers Data].
[Vol. 95:456
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fact that murders of whites occur more frequently or are more
often the heinous sort that justifies the death penalty - or
whether the discrepancy was indeed caused by an unconscious
or conscious belief that killing a white person is a more serious
crime than killing a black one.
The overwhelming majority of the offenders on death row,
85 out of x14, were convicted of murders committed during
the course of a felony such as rape, robbery, or burglary.
These murders during felonies are similar enough to constitute
an appropriate universe against which to compare the relative
frequency of commitments to death row. Table i relates the
number of arrests19 for homicides committed during a felony
TABLE I
FLORIDA ARRESTS FOR MURDERS DURING A FELONY AND
FLORIDA DEATH Row POPULATION GROUPED BY RACE OF
OFFENDER AND RACE OF VICTIM
2 0
Offenders Reaching Death Row
Race Arrests for Murders After 1972 and
Offender - Victim During a Felony Before September 1977
Black-White 781268 37}
White - White 190 46 83
Black- Black 1021110 1White - Black 8 1 
Total: 378 8421
19 Arrests are the relevant statistic to consider here, because, as will be shown,
see infra p. 466, the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty may be
made at many different points prior to trial or conviction.
20 See FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports (,976-1977) (on file at the Center for
Applied Social Research, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts) [hereinafter
cited as FBI Homicide Reports]; Sheppard & Carithers Data, supra note i8. The
FBI began compiling homicide arrest figures in January I976. By the time of the
Spinkellink hearing in September i977, the FBI had recorded 189 Florida arrests for
homicides committed during a felony. Because the Florida death row population as
presented in this table derives not from these recorded 21 months, but from a period
roughly twice that long, I have estimated the approximate number of arrests by
doubling the FBI numbers from the available 2 1-month period.
Three remarks are in order. First, such doubling is justified by the fact that the
distribution of murder arrests by race of victim and offender remains fairly constant,
as the FBI Homicide Reports make clear. Second, this doubling does not affect the
position of the four victim-offender race combinations with respect to their relative
likelihood of reaching death row. Third, the doubling of the numbers approximates
the likelihood that a person arrested for murder during a felony will end up on death
row. Because it is only an approximation, however, I have used the term "ratio" in
Figures i and 2 and not "likelihood" or "probability."
21 In addition, two offenders, one black and one white, had killed both a white
and a black victim.
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to the respective numbers of offenders on death row in four
race-of-offender and race-of-victim combinations.
The data in Table i suggest that the victim's race makes
a difference in the likelihood of receiving a capital sentence.
Figure i expresses these data in percentage terms.
FIGURE 1
RATIO OF OFFENDERS ON FLORIDA DEATH ROW TO ARRESTEES
FOR MURDER DURING A FELONY, BY RACE OF VICTIM
White Black
Victims Victims
Percentage of
Arrestees Reaching
Death Row 31%
Total Number: 268 1o
The ratio of offenders on death row to arrestees for murder
during a felony is thirty-one percent for murderers of white
victims as compared to one percent for murderers of black
victims, a ratio of 31 to I. Figure 2 breaks down the data in
Figure I into the four race-of-offender and race-of-victim com-
binations.
Forty-seven percent of the black defendants arrested for
murdering a white victim were sent to Florida's death row;
only twenty-four percent of the white defendants arrested for
murdering a white victim received the same sentence. When
both the victim and offender were black, the ratio sank to one
percent. There were no white persons on death row for killing
only a black person; there had never been such a person on
Florida's death row in living memory.
These data, strongly suggesting the effect of race upon
administration of the death penalty, were presented to the
Spinkellink federal district court with the following comments:
(i) There is a widely-held sentiment that killing a black per-
son (particularly since the killer is usually also black) is
not quite as serious a crime as killing a white person; it
is indeed a standard argument of defense lawyers in the
sentencing phase of trials for a violent crime by a black
[VOL. 95:456
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FIGURE 2
RATIO OF OFFENDERS ON FLORIDA DEATH ROW TO THE NUMBER
OF FLORIDA ARRESTS FOR MURDER DURING A FELONY, BY RACE
OF OFFENDER AND RACE OF VICTIM
Offender: Black White Black White
Victim: White White Black Black
Percentage
of Arrestees
Reaching
Death Row 47%
S 24%
o0%
Total 
1 0...
Number: 78 19o 102 8
offender upon a black victim to ask for leniency because
"among black folks violence is a more accepted way of
life."
(2) The statistics provide prima facie evidence of bias, strong
enough to suggest that the burden of proving that no such
bias exists should shift to the prosecutor. He should be
required to show that the statistical discrepancy is the
result of some factor other than bias.2
2
Neither the district court 23 nor the Fifth Circuit court of
appeals was impressed; the Fifth Circuit dismissed the argu-
ment, saying: "The allegation that Florida's death penalty is
being discriminatorily applied to defendants who murder
whites is nothing more than an allegation .... "24 And in
due course John Spenkelink went to the electric chair.
II. A SEEMING DETOUR: THE DR. SPOCK EFFECT
Before proceeding further, we shall make what may seem
a detour. That detour, however, will aid our understanding
of what follows.
When Dr. Benjamin Spock was tried in 1969 before Judge
22 See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 203-04, 277, 296, Spinkellink v.
Wainwright, No. 77-0895 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 1977).
23 Spinkellink v. Wainwright, No. 77-0895 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2977).
24 Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 613 (5th Cir. 2978).
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Ford in the federal district court25 in Boston for conspiracy to
violate the Military Service Act, there were only nine women
in the ioo-member jury venire from which the eventual jury
was chosen. The two women who reached voir dire were an
easy prey for the prosecutor's preemptory challenges, and Dr.
Spock was tried before an all-male jury and convicted. Of all
defendants, Dr. Spock, who had given wise and welcome
advice on childrearing to millions of mothers, would have liked
to have seen women on his jury.
Nine women out of ioo persons seemed to me at the time
an odd draw from a jury box containing 35o names, alleged
to have been randomly selected from voter lists on which
women were in the majority. Puzzled, I began to investigate
Judge Ford's jury selection methods. 26
The investigation revealed that twenty-nine percent of the
350 persons in the jury box had been women. The difference
from the more than fifty percent proportion of women on the
voter lists was explained during pretrial testimony by the clerk
of the court, who admitted that he had violated the rules of
random selection by skipping some of the female names. He
defended the practice by saying that in his experience women
were so much more often excused than men that it was prudent
to have fewer of them invited in the first place. 27
The odds against drawing only nine women by chance out
of ioo names from a pool that contained twenty-nine percent
of women remained substantial. Still, these were only odds;
anything was possible. The next step in the investigation,
however, revealed odds so high that for all practical purposes
chance was excluded as an explanation for Judge Ford's poor
yield of women. When I examined the jury venires of Judge
Ford in earlier trials, the same curious discrepancy emerged.
As Figure 3 shows, although the venires of the other judges
normally centered around the true twenty-nine percent average
for women in the jury box, Judge Ford's venires centered
around an average of fourteen percent.
The likelihood that chance accounted for such consistent
discrepancies in the proportion of women jurors in the venires
of Judge Ford and those of his colleagues is microscopic. Still,
even these were only odds. But then came the event that
removed the last remnant of doubt, if there was any, that
Judge Ford had improperly manipulated jury selection. After
25 United States v. Coffin, Crim. No. 68-i-F (D. Mass. 1968), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 65 (ist Cir. i969).
26 See Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. i, 1-i8 (1969).
27 See id. at 2, 9.
[Vol. 95:456
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FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF JURY VENIRES ACCORDING TO THE PERCENT OF
WOMEN IN THE VENIRES
28
I. The Venirest of Judge Ford's Six Colleagues
300.
Number of z--
Jurors in
Venire
S , 7 9T 3 " 3 "s27293" 3 357 39 4 43 45 47 49 51
Percent Women
II. The Venires of Judge Ford
Number of
Jurors in TO0.
Venire
S• 9 TT13 i5 e7 e9 T 23 25
Percent Women
t Horizontal lines in bars separate individual venires.
Judge Ford learned of my investigation, he selected a venire
for his next trial. The black square in Figure 3 indicates the
proportion of women jurors in that venire. It was twenty-four
percent, the first of Judge Ford's venires in which the propor-
tion of women was within the normal range around the av-
erage of twenty-nine percent. 29
From that time on, Judge Ford's selections of jury venires
lost their peculiarity. But by mending his ways, he completed
the proof that the drawing of prospective jurors for his court
had been improper. First, there was the highly improbable
28 Venire lists of the Federal District Court of Massachusetts (1966-i968) (collected
by Hans Zeisel), discussed in Zeisel, supra note 26.
29 By the time these data were ready for presentation to the courts, Dr. Spock
had already been convicted and the case was on appeal. An effort by his lawyers to
obtain an interview with Judge Ford remained unsuccessful. The data were then
submitted in affidavit form to the court of appeals, which had the memorandum
sealed. Eventually, the court of appeals reversed Dr. Spock's conviction on first
amendment grounds, United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (ist Cir. 1969), so that
the selection of his jury became a moot issue.
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statistical anomaly. Then came the removal of the anomaly
once it was known to be under critical scrutiny - a plain
admission of impropriety. This two-step proof - we called it
the Dr. Spock effect - might deserve a place in the law of
evidence.
Ill. THE ADMISSION
We now return to our story of the administration of the
death penalty and to the data that emerged from Florida, first
at the time of Furman and then after Spinkellink.
State officials had hotly denied that the figures submitted
in Maxwell and Spinkellink, 30 and similar data presented to
the Supreme Court in the Furman briefs, demonstrated racial
discrimination. Here then, in Figure 4, are the proportions of
black offenders on death row first at the time of Furman and
then during the years following Furman (1973 through I980).
At the time of Furman, sixty-seven percent of the persons
on Florida's death row were black; during the eight-and-a-half
years that followed, only forty percent of the offenders who
were sent to death row were black.
FIGURE 4
PROPORTION OF BLACKS ON FLORIDA's DEATH Row AT THE TIME
OF FURMAN IN 1972 AND DURING THE EIGHT-AND-ONE-HALF
YEARS THEREAFTER 31
On Death Row at Reaching Death Row After
Time of Furman Furman and Through I98O
Percent (Number) Percent (Number)
Blacks as 67% (64)
Percentage of
Death Row
Population 40% (91)
Total: ioo% (96) IOO% (228)
30 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 6o-66, Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d
582 (5th Cir. 1978) (No. 77-2940); Brief for Respondent at 7-17, Maxwell v. Bishop,
398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. z968) (No. 18746).
31 Sheppard & Carithers Data, supra note i8.
[Vol. 95:456
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The story of the second bias, which the courts at the time
considered an unproven allegation, is essentially the same, as
shown in Figure 5. The proportion of offenders on death row
who had killed black victims rose from four percent at the
time of Spinkellink to twelve percent during the following
three years.
FIGURE 5
PROPORTION OF OFFENDERS ON FLORIDA'S DEATH Row WHO
HAD KILLED SOLELY BLACK PERSONS AT TIME OF THE
SPINKELLINK HEARING IN 1977 AND DURING THE THREE YEARS
THEREAFTER
32
At Time of After Spinkellink and
Spinkellink Through 198o
Percent (Number) Percent (Number)
Percentage of
Offenders Who Had
Killed Solely
Black Persons 12% (12)
4% (5)
Total: 1OO% (114) ioo% (99)
Some of the details of this "reform period" in the admin-
istration of the Florida death penalty are illuminating. Figure
2 above shows that the likelihood before September 1977 that
a white offender who had killed only a black victim would
reach death row was exactly zero. In an obvious effort to
correct the imbalance, Florida prosecutors have recently de-
manded the death penalty in two such cases. In one case, the
defendants, who had no major criminal records, had killed a
clerk during the holdup of a convenience store. The public
defender had asked the jury, "If we kill for this, what do we
do for career criminals, torture murderers?" 33 In rediscovered
fervor, the prosecutor told the all-white jury in the sentencing
phase of that trial: "Our founding fathers talked about equal
32 Id.
33 Florida Times Union, July 3, i98o, at B3, col. 3.
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justice and today you have a chance to say we have equal
justice . . . .The case is crying out for justice to be done."' 34
The jury understood and recommended the death penalty.
Subsequently questioned by a reporter, the prosecutor denied
"that race played a part in the trial."' 35 The judge who pre-
sided over the trial did not accept the jury's recommendation
and sentenced the defendant to life in prison. 36
In the second case, William Middleton, a white man, had
killed an elderly black woman following an argument. He
was put on trial in September 198o. Again, the prosecutor
demanded the death penalty. This time jury and judge agreed,
and Middleton became the first white offender in memory to
enter Florida's death row for the crime of killing solely a black
victim. 3
7
IV. TENTATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The foregoing data have shown that a defendant's chance
of going to death row has been affected by the race of his
victim and by his own race. There remains the intriguing task
of explaining this differential treatment. I offer here for fur-
ther study a number of tentative explanations that focus on
the role of the prosecutor. I concentrate on the role of the
prosecutor, and not on the role of the judge or jury, because
the prosecutor has overpowering control over the flow of of-
fenders to death row. His power stems from three crucial
opportunities to intervene in the criminal process. First, he
formulates the charge that determines whether or not the death
penalty is permitted if a conviction is obtained. Second, the
prosecutor has almost unbounded discretion to offer a life
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea in cases for which capital
punishment is possible. Third, even after conviction at trial
the prosecutor may or may not demand the death penalty, or
may demand it only perfunctorily. Jury and judge come into
play only if the prosecutor, by his first three decisions, invites
them to participate in the process.
(i) One explanation centers on the prosecutor's concern for
managing his caseload in a manner that will maximize public
acceptance. Trying a capital case is an onerous, time-consum-
ing, and costly job for the prosecutor. When his calendar is
34 Jacksonville J., July 3, I98o, at io, col. i.
35 Id.
36 State v. Graham, No. 8o-4 3-CF (Nassau County Ct., Fla., Sept. 25, i98o).
37 State v. Middleton, No. 80-3289 (Dade County Ct., Fla., Sept. 25, I98o). I
could not help noting that the judge who refused to follow the jury's recommendation
was black; the judge who concurred with the jury's view on the death penalty was
white.
[Vol. 95:456
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crowded, he might consider avoiding trial by offering a life
sentence for a guilty plea. If a case has received little public-
ity, even a community eager to punish such crimes by death
would not criticize the prosecutor for accepting a life sentence.
Such a case is more likely to involve a victim who is a member
of a racial minority because the press, and thereby the com-
munity, is less likely to pay attention to a minority-victim case.
In addition, more blacks than whites are opposed to the
death penalty.38 When a member of a racial minority is the
victim, in over ninety percent of the cases the offender is also
a minority group member. Given the lack of sympathy for the
death penalty among blacks, allowing such a defendant to
plead guilty with a life sentence is unlikely to offend public
opinion. Public opinion is more likely to be aroused if the
victim is white, especially since roughly one-half of the mur-
ders of white persons are committed by minority members;
these cases are likely to receive greater media attention, mak-
ing it more difficult for the prosecutor to offer a deal.
(2) The second possible explanation is less generous. The
prosecutor may have a racial bias that affects his decision to
seek the death penalty. The grim lawyers' joke about the law
of homicide in Kentucky might also have roots in other states:
If a black man kill a white man, that be first degree
murder; if a white man kill a white man, that be second
degree murder; if a black man kill a black man, that be
manslaughter; but if a white man kill a black man, that be
excusable homicide - unless a woman was involved, in which
case the black man died of apoplexy.
(3) Finally, there is the explanation proposed by the French
sociologist Durkheim that the crossing of social boundaries into
tabooed areas within a society invokes the society's most pu-
nitive and repressive responses. 39 In American society there
are some low-status whites and a few high-status blacks. But
race is a key determinant: most blacks are low status on
grounds of race alone. Therefore, if the death penalty is re-
served for the most tabooed border crossings - the low-status
person's crime against the high-status person - the expected
pattern will be exactly what we see: virtually no death sen-
tences for the murders of blacks (because black victims are
generally low-status); some death sentences for murders of
3s The Gallup polls in recent years consistently show the proportion of white
persons who favor the death penalty to be roughly twice as high as the corresponding
proportion among blacks. See Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty:
"Facts v. Faith," 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 317.
39 See E. DURKHEIM, ON THE DMSION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (G. Simpson trans.
1947).
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whites by whites (where the victims are high-status but the
defendants are low-status whites - outlanders, riffraff, white
trash); and a still higher proportion of death sentences for the
murder of whites by blacks.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the explanation, none excuses the documented
differential treatment; each explanation only confirms the treat-
ment's racial character. Instead of denying the significance of
the pattern, the courts should ask prosecutors to show, if they
can, how this pervasive pattern of differentiation is justified
in light of Furman and the Constitution.
Prosecutors may try to present the post-Spinkellink statis-
tics as proof that they have put their hotise in order, whatever-
injustices may have been committed earlier. They may claim
that their hands are now sufficiently clean and that there is no
reason for further concern. That argument should not be
accepted in view of the consistent pattern, revealed in this.
Comment, of official denial of bias followed by changes thaf
tacitly admit that very bias. First, the prosecutors were con-
fronted with proof of racial offender-bias. After vigorously
denying its existence, they set out to reduce it. Next, the
prosecutors were confronted with proof of racial victim-bias.
Again they denied its existence, only to acknowledge it by
subsequently changing their ways. Yet these changes in no
way guarantee that the racial bias has ended. The changes
have been in the direction away from bias, but it is highly
unlikely that bias has been eliminated. Whether the changes
have been more than cosmetic is a subject that will require
further inquiry.
In the process of responding to these charges of bias, more-
over, the prosecutors have proved a general and more dam-
aging proposition: namely, that they can change the character
of the death row population at will and that their discretionary
power to determine the death row population is not within
any legal boundaries.
This Comment has dealt only with evidence of racial bias,
because that bias is at the center of the law's concern and
would seem to be most easily discoverable. Yet the serendi-
pitous character of the discovery of the racial victim-bias
makes clear that other inequities are bound to emerge in due
time or, worse, remain undiscovered.
There simply is no way to ensure the evenhanded admin-
istration of the death penalty. That alone should be sufficient
reason for its abolition.
[Vol. 95:456
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